Introduction
Whether we like it or not, elites mattered in economic history. Throughout history, they helped define the rules of the game of the economy: priests and kings wrote the laws, and judges enforced them. The voice of the people may have the voice of God, as the Romans had it, but they rarely determined outcomes. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) distinguish between de jure power (which is the power of the law) and de facto power exercised by larger groups but which operated more as a constraint on those running the day-to-day business. Yet while in exercising political power the masses could still on occasion matter a lot, on the matter of technological progress and intellectual innovation we are confined to what is now increasingly knows as "upper tail human capital" -the skills and knowledge of the best scientists, artisans, engineers, mechanics and physicians. In a famous prophetic line, the great seventeenth century scientist and experimentalist Robert Hooke wrote that the world of useful inventions remained to be conquered by "a Cortesian army, well-Disciplined and regulated, though their numbers be but small" (cited in Hunter, 1989, p. 233) . The metaphor well-illustrates the idea that the envelope of useful knowledge is pushed 1 forward by a relatively small number of people. The notion that economic growth driven by advancing knowledge is a top-down mechanisms was equally well-expressed by Adam Smith when he noted that "to think or to reason comes to be, like every other employment, a particular business, which is carried on by very few people who furnish the public with all the thought and reason possessed by the vast multitudes that labour." The benefits of the "speculations of the philosopher ... may evidently descend to the meanest of people" if they led to improvements in the mechanical arts (Smith, 1978, pp. 569-72) .
There is no question that we should be careful to avoid the kind of hero-worship that Victorian writers of the Industrial Revolution such as Samuel Smiles at times engaged in. In large part, the great inventors whose names are immortalized in Smiles's books and modern biographical dictionaries depended on hundreds of lesser-known and unknown ingenious artisans and engineers who made the microinventions that tweaked and adapted the bigger breakthroughs and made them work better and break down less. Below them were thousands of other workers whose skills and competence turned prototypes and blueprints into actual working machines, who read and interpreted instructions, scaled up models, and who could install, operate, and repair the equipment embodying the new technology. There are deep complementarities between the small group of people who actually invented things and can be identified as such, and the larger group of skilled workmen who possessed the training and natural dexterity to actually carry out with a high degree of accuracy the "instructions" contained in the new recipes and blueprints that inventors wrote, build the parts on a routine basis with very low degrees of tolerance, and still could fill in the blanks when the instructions were inevitably incomplete (Meisenzahl and Mokyr, 2012) . Many new technological designs came about through small, cumulative improvements made by mostly unknown craftsmen and diffused through the networks of technically literate masters and journeymen who became increasingly adept at disseminating tacit knowledge.
All the same, the people in these groups in toto remained a small minority, and economic development in these areas can be viewed as their actions eventually affecting the economic status of the rest of the population, not so much a trickle-down as a dragging-along. Yet high-skilled artisans by themselves could not bring about technological revolutions, even if they could adapt and improve existing techniques up to a point. At times what was needed was a crucial and radically novel insight in the way natural forces operated
The exact modus operandi of this top-down mechanism varied greatly from situation to situation. The elites (nobility and well-to-do bourgeoisie) of early modern Europe acquired education, studied science, and read books, and others followed and imitated them. It is not surprising that intellectual innovations were first aimed at educated people who could access them using printed sources or letters. They were therefore more likely to be persuaded by new information and less committed to their parents's ideas or those of teachers reflecting their parents' values. However, greater exposure to new information and ideas opened doors; it did not force anyone to walk through them. Educated people might have had a vested interest in adhering to the ideas they learned early in life and resisted radical change. Much of the elite educational structure of the time -not least many conservative universities and Jesuit schools -was still reproducing knowledge embodied in the classical canon, and was resistant to the point of imperviousness to new ideas. Yet, in the long run, the venerable ideas and techniques that had been in use for countless generation had to make room for the intellectual innovations of the age.
Technological creativity involved both utilizing existing knowledge and its negation -that is, the willingness to look critically at existing practices and knowledge and think "outside the box." Such willingness to challenge conventional wisdom is rarely a common trait. As long as there are enough non-conformist, contrarian, and arrogant individuals who have the willingness and ability to go against the grain, and as long as the political environment is sufficiently friendly so that "deviant thinkers" do not have constantly have to be concerned about being charged with heresy, black magic, or some other form of non-conformist persecution, there is a good chance that radical departures in science and technology will occur. Economies may experience economic progress as a consequence. Yet the conditions for such economic progress to occur and be sustained are rather strong and many disparate elements have to come together at just the right time. It is not surprising that they only occurred once in history. What is perhaps more surprising is that they occurred at all.
What counts disproportionately is the culture of an educated elite. As noted, advances in useful knowledge were made by a relatively small percentage of the population. Once acquired, the attitudes and aptitudes of a better-informed and more practical and materially oriented elite eventually affected larger and larger segments of the population. A summary description of technological progress in the past 250 years is that a technological elite of scientists, engineers, agronomists, and skilled mechanics designed a set of novel production techniques. Subsequently, it became necessary for employers to have more educated workers who could operate and maintain the complex equipment-what is known as skill-technology complementarity, associated with the second Industrial Revolution in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Prelude to the Industrial Revolution
Developments in Europe in the centuries before the Industrial Revolution were in many ways decisive in bringing about the Industrial Revolution: nobody really thinks that the wave of technological advances that began in the eighteenth century were a freak event in which they rained down on Europe like a sudden thunderbolt. But which developments really counted? Many have pointed to institutional changes that changed how institutions changed and created better property rights, the rule of law, and less rapacious governance due to constraints imposed on rulers. Others have pointed to European expansion after 1450 and the growth of "ghost acreage" and "ghost labor" in overseas Continents, including slavery, sugar, raw cotton, and the growth of long-distance commerce. Trade with the East exposed Europe to certain goods and techniques such as cotton cloth and chinaware and technological progress was supposedly triggered by import substitution. Religion and the Reformation have also been credited, both in the Weberian form and more sophisticated versions of it.
Three recent works in economic history, Clark (2007) , Mokyr (2009 ), McCloskey (2010 have -in very different ways -examined the array of explanations of why the Industrial Revolution occurred in the eighteenth century in western Europe and not some other place and time (or never at all) and found almost all of them wanting. All three works in the final analysis fall back on a cultural explanation of sorts, though they postulate very different mechanism in what is driving innovation.
The emphasis on elites and their belief has many dimensions. For one thing, elites often set the hierarchy of values in society. The nobility set norms and values that middle class people wanted to emulate in the best traditions of the bourgeois gentilhomme. Moreover, in extractive societies dominated by a small, wealthy, but unproductive and exploitative elite, the low social prestige of productive activity meant that creativity and innovation would be directed toward an agenda of interest to the elite. The educated and sophisticated elite focused on efforts supporting its power such as military prowess and administration, or on such topics of leisure as literature, games, the arts, and philosophy, and not so much on the mundane problems of the farmer in his field, the sailor on his
The agenda of the leisurely elite was of great importance to the lovers of music in the eighteenth-century 2 Habsburg lands, but was not of much interest to their farmers and manufacturers. The Austrian Empire created Haydn and Mozart, but no Industrial Revolution.
One symptom of a cultural change in Europe was the emergence in the seventeenth century of a peculiar upper 3 class trend known as "virtuosity"-a word that meant something quite different in early modern Europe than it does today. Originally a product of Italian courts and heavily influenced by Italian norms of behavior, it depicted an upper class fascination with learning and the arts, combining the features of scholar and gentleman into a serious if perhaps somewhat amateurish intellectual. But the virtuosi provided much-needed respectability to those who contemplated engaging in intellectual endeavors and they turned curiosity, once regarded as a vice, into a virtue (Houghton, 1942) . Whether the virtuoso movement as a whole was a success in reforming the views of the British aristocratic elite and turning them into a building block of the Industrial Enlightenment remains an open question. There was a continuous gradation from leisurely and possibly bored wealthy gentlemen who played with science (such as Boyle and Evelyn) to the serious (if often impecunious) professional natural philosophers such as Ray and Hooke.
ship, or the artisan in his workshop. status people whom young and ambitious persons would want to imitate took a long time to form, but at least two giants in British history, Newton and Watt, managed to achieve exactly that (Fara 2002; MacLeod, 2007) . On the continent things were moving along the same lines. In early eighteenth-century France, the new science was especially valued and became part of high society and a new political culture in which a powerful alliance was created between the savants of the A possibly apocryphal story has it that a letter sent from China by a Mandarin, addressed simply to 'the 4 illustrious doctor Boerhaave, physician in Europe,' reached him without delay.
One striking finding is that in this respect textiles were quite different from other, and that high-quality 5 technicians in that sector had relatively little formal education, unlike other sectors in the Industrial Revolution. This should serve as a warning that generalizations about the Industrial Revolution based largely on the experience of the cotton industry (Allen, 2009 ) may be unsupportable.
Republic of Letters and the royal administration (Shank, 2008, p. 88) . The Dutch physician Herman Boerhaave was so famous in his time that Peter the Great sat in on his classes and Voltaire and Linnaeus traveled to Leyden to meet him. The effective allocation of talent and human capital in 4 the very extreme upper tail of the distribution of talent was sensitive to such signals.
Yet the Industrial Revolution was not made by superstars alone. As noted, the mechanics and engineers who tweaked and implemented the new techniques and made them work made the Industrial Revolution possible. They came from a variety of backgrounds, of course, and their training and education differed. Most, but not all, were literate and educated to some extent, either through apprenticeship or formal schools (Meisenzahl and Mokyr, 2012) . High quality artisans 5 were a necessary part of the technological revolutions, but they were not enough. Without new and often radical ideas about how nature worked, artisanal ingenuity would have run into diminishing returns and eventually progress would have ground to a halt as happened in the high-level artisanal economies of the Middle East and South Asia (Berg, 2007; Mokyr, 2007) . Thus, modern economic growth was the outcome of the efforts of two elites, a small groups of savants and a larger (but still smallish) group of fabricants, and the interaction between them in the best traditions of the Baconian program.
The degree to which history is driven by a "vital few" and their indispensability has been controversial. Most modern historians have tended to dismiss the impact of individuals on history Most economic historians today would still agree with David Hume that "what depends upon a few persons 6 is, in great measure, to be ascribed to chance, or secret and unknown causes; what arises from a great number may often be accounted for by determinate and known causes" (Hume [1742 (Hume [ ], 1985 by mocking the "intellectual prowess and persuasive capabilities of a few men" and stressing cultural change as "a confluence of available ideas," although one is left wondering where such influential ideas might have come from in the first place (Lowengard, 2006, p. 6) . In contrast, Jonathan Hughes (1986, p. 2) wrote that "to ignore the impact of individuals on our historical development would be like studying physiology without considering the actions of the organs and cells on the body and each other." Technological advances in the period of the Industrial Revolution was a minority affair; 6 most entrepreneurs and industrialists of the time were not like Matthew Boulton, Jedediah Strutt, or Josiah Wedgwood and had little knowledge of or interest in science or even innovation, just as most landowners were not improvers. But the dynamics of competition in a market economy are such that in the long run, the few drag along the many. Yet this does not explain what it was that motivated and incentivized the minority that drove the historical dynamics.
Positive and Negative Incentives
Economists teach that people are motivated by incentives. Contrary to popular opinion, they do not argue that people are only driven by greed. But people, and even scientists and philosophers, have to eat and clearly making ends meet and working in a secure environment matters. For a few the chance of striking it rich is a powerful incentive. However, as is widely recognized, the production of new knowledge is severely under-incentivized simply because knowledge cannot be owned and made into property from which others can be excluded. Knowledge cannot be fenced in:
once the original creator has given it to another person, he or she has lost control over its further
In modern economics this idea has been applied widely, not just by the use of dyads such as the "Lucas 7
Critique" and the "Arrow Theorem" but even more so by the use of adjectives such as "Schumpeterian dynamics" and "Samuelsonian economics." dissemination. As a result, there is a serious danger that knowledge will be systematically underproduced -the people who generate it cannot expect to be paid for their troubles and expenses. Indeed, knowledge shares many of the features of the commons (Ostrom and Hess, 2007) . And yet, just as commons do not always become a tragedy but can be managed by a community, knowledge can be properly incentivized.
The basic idea about incentivizing the creators of knowledge is "credit without profit." Priority rights were the equivalent of ownership for intellectual innovations. The creator would earn credit as the rightful discoverer of some natural regularity or phenomenon, or the originator of a new idea, but such priority rights did not include the right to exclude others from using it. Instead, the originator was credited by other members of the community as the original innovator. A successful intellectual innovator would have her or his name associated with the new idea so that the idea and its progenitor become a dyad as "Boyle's Law" or a "Poisson process," and thus while the progenitor does not own the new idea (in the sense of excluding others), he or she is credited with it and may therefore gain in terms of reputation.
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For this kind of mechanism to work, what is needed is a community and a language that recognizes these reputations and acknowledges the credit that the creators of intellectual innovations have earned. The fundamental fact that changed history is that such a community emerged in early modern Europe in the form of the "Republic of Letters." This institution is distinctly not a historical construct. It was widely recognized by literate people at the time who regarded themselves as "citizens" of the Republic. The incentive mechanism was driven by reputation. For a philosopher, Even a wealthy scientist as Robert Boyle eventually became annoyed by people using his work without 8 attribution and instructed Henry Oldenburg, the secretary of the Royal Society, to produce a catalog of his writings to secure his intellectual property rights in this research (Shapin, 1994, p. 183; Hunter, 2009, p. 190 ). a physician, or a scientist to succeed, he or she had to gain the respect of peers. Reputation was valuable for its own sake. Shocking as it may sound, intellectuals in the seventeenth century had egos and vanity much like their counterparts in the twenty-first century. Fame was sought even if it came without fortune. All the same, reputation was important because it was correlated with patronage 8 jobs, the kind of jobs that most would-be academics dreamed about. It is inconceivable to describe the world of learning and scholarship of early modern Europe without stressing the pervasiveness of the patronage system, in which powerful and rich people protected and encouraged talented and creative individuals (Feingold, 1984, p. 190; Westfall, 1985) . Being a court-philosopher and advisor to the prince or king, such as Galileo or Leibniz, a tutor to royal children like Descartes, the occupier of a remunerative patronage job like Newton, or a court physician like the French doctor and polymath Pierre-Michon Bourdelot were the peaks of success that scholars and intellectuals could hope to achieve. To attain that, they had to impress their peers, have their letters and books read and cited, and gain name recognition throughout the transnational Republic of Letters.
Equally important was the decline in negative incentives. Conventional wisdom and entrenched intellectual interests have a way of fiercely defending their positions by declaring dissenting voices as "apostasy" and "heresy." Intellectuals thinking outside the box and criticizing venerable positions held for generations rarely were popular. In many societies, including Ming and Qing China, the Islamic Middle East, and Jewish communities before 1750, such voices were stifled and suppressed, and novelty was only allowed if it conformed to the constraints imposed on it by the existing wisdom. Such suppression fell apart in early modern Europe, despite the spectacular cases of Miguel Servetus, Giordano Bruno, and Galileo. This was not so much because Europeans became miraculously more enlightened and tolerant (though there was some of that as well) as much as a massive coordination failure among the oppressive and reactionary powers of Europe, who were at each throats too much to turn on heretics. European intellectuals learned to play the great powers against one another in various ways: to avoid censorship they published abroad, as was the case with Galileo's "banned" books, which were smuggled out of Italy and published in Protestant cities, such as the Discorsi published in Leiden in 1638 and the Dialogo re-published in Strasbourg in 1635. If necessary, they could move to a more welcoming place, precisely because scholarly reputations were transnational. Many did, of course, none more so than Paracelsus, the iconoclastic Swiss doctor who made it his life's mission to debunk Galenian medicine and the Moravian philosopher Jan Comenius.
Other ways of playing the great powers against one another were available: the Dutch mathematician In short, political fragmentation or the "States System," as Eric Jones has famously termed it, is often credited with restraining European rulers in a variety of ways. The most important of those was their inability to suppress intellectual innovation in the Republic of Letters. After 1650, such attempts were little more than window-dressing. Radical writers from Spinoza down were denounced and censured, but any serious attempt to prosecute them was symbolic at most, such as Diderot's three-month prison term in Vincennes for publishing his Letter on Blindness. Most rulers in Europe realized the futility of clamping down on dissident thought in their nations, and instead invited dissidents to their courts, as was for example the French radical philosophe Julien Lamettrie, a welcome guest at Frederic the Great's court in Potsdam.
Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations
Focusing on incentives for scientific and technological progress, in the past as well as in the present, misses out on the fact that much original and creative work is intrinsically motivated. That is to say, the work itself may have high and positive utility and would be carried out even in the absence of any material or other incentives. Subject to a minimum consumption constraint, creative intellectuals would work, research, and write without any obvious material incentives. In practice, only a few of the major figures of the scientific revolution could be thought as altogether indifferent to material motives. Most of them depended on patronage to survive and wanted it for its social status and prestige. Such patronage took various forms, from the sinecure position of master of the mint that Newton occupied from 1699, Leibniz's position as councillor to the Duke of Brunswick, to the large group of intellectuals and scientists congregated at the courts of Emperor Rudolf II and crown prince Henry Frederick or at the académie royale in Paris.
Yet creative people have odd utility functions, and recognizing this fact should condition the search for additional motives and incentives in creating new useful knowledge. The norms prevalent in the communities in which new knowledge is created may have driven some intellectuals toward intellectual innovation without any obvious material incentives. Despite the often-heard notion that As Kreps points out (1997, p. 361) , "When tasks are ambiguous and creativity is valuable, it is hard to say ex 9 ante what should be done. Opportunistic responses to contingencies that arise are better than responses made to maximize some formula specified ex ante." economists think that most economic actions are driven by self-interest and greed, many of them have thought long and hard about what happens when people are motivated by "intrinsic motives," that is, they carry out economic actions without any obvious material incentives (e.g. Besley and Ghatak, 2008) . In the setting of a firm, such incentives make sense if they are low-cost for the owner and if they stimulate effort in areas in which output is hard to measure and verify.
As pointed out by Kreps (1997) , the distinctions between intrinsic motivation and status incentives can be fairly tricky. Kreps notes that in most employment situations (and that covers the bulk of the citizens of the Republic of Letters) it is hard to see the absence of any extrinsic motivation. He notes that "what is called intrinsic motivation may be (at least in part) the worker's response to fuzzy extrinsic motivators, such as fear of discharge, censure by fellow employees, or even the desire for coworkers' esteem." It is the latter, more than anything, that drove the Republic of Letters, although here "coworkers' esteem" should be read as "the opinion of other scientists and intellectuals" and realize that such reputations effects often led to commissions, appointments, and pensions from wealthy and powerful patrons and yet it was desirable for its own sake.
Intellectual and technological innovation are inherently hard to incentivize for obvious reasons: the output is uncertain and often unexpected, and the inputs contain different amounts of perspiration and inspiration, as well as a great deal of randomness, background knowledge, and dexterity. The difficulty with vague ex ante criteria is that they are seriously in danger of moral 9 hazard, and invite cheating and corruption. As Kreps notes, however, such problems can be mitigated by peer evaluation and working in small groups, two conditions that were abundantly met in the early It is indeed telling that one of the co-inventors of MRI diagnosis, Raymond Damadian, was denied the Nobel . . It is the vanity, not the ease of the pleasure, which interests us. But vanity is always founded upon our belief of our being the object of attention and approbation." Smith does not dismiss extrinsic motivation, in the sense that ambitious people want to build a reputation among their peers, but instead extends the idea of extrinsic motivation to a realm beyond material gain: a reputation among one's group of reference. Accumulating wealth, noted Smith in this famous passage, was not really about increasing one's comforts in life. "The rich man glories in his riches, because he feels that they naturally draw upon him the attention of the world. . . . Everybody is eager to look at him. . . . His actions are the objects of the public care. Scarce a word, scarce a gesture can fall from him that is altogether neglected. In a great assembly he is the person upon whom all direct their eyes. . . . It is this, which . . . renders greatness the object of envy and compensates . . . all that toil, all that anxiety, all those mortifications which must be undergone in the pursuit of it " Smith, [1759 " Smith, [ ] 1976 This passage might well apply to Nobel Prize winners, the holy grail of academe. A small but important literature in economics has focused on non-monetary awards to individuals who make outstanding contributions to society (for a summary see Frey and Gallus, 2015) . It raises a number of important questions, such as the relative importance of monetary vs. pure honorary prizes, as well as whether they stimulate further effort by the winning or a "rest-on-yourlaurels" effect. It is clear that as a high-powered incentive, they are a blunt instrument since there is no correlation between the economic value of a contribution (even in the rare case that such a value could be measured) and the value of the award. Furthermore, because awards are normally discretionary (that is, not linked to a specific pre-determined goal), they tend to be vulnerable to complaints about conservatism, cronyism, arbitrariness, and bias. There is also the notion ---less 11 prevalent in scientific and technological creative work ---that the existence of awards biases work to please the expected criteria of the judges. The effect of prizes and awards on subsequent work seems fairly small (and negative in the case of the Fields prize in mathematics), but this seems a fairly minor quibble even if we can correct for selection bias.
Among intellectual innovators in the academic world, one of the oldest and most effective forms of honoring success is the endowed named chair, a practice already found in the ancient world in which Marcus Aurelius endowed some chairs in philosophy in the second century AD (Frede, 2012) . The practice was revived in early modern Europe, with the emergence of the Republic of Letters. A key figure in this regard was Lady Margaret Beaufort, the mother of the first Tudor king Henry VII, who in 1502 established the Lady Margaret's professorship of divinity at the University The achievement of the Montgolfière brothers was recognized by elevating their father into the nobility in 12 1783, perhaps not the best time in French history to join the first Estate. Etienne was inducted into the French Academy of Sciences in 1796, and Joseph was given the legion of honor by Napoleon. Jenner, of course, became a legend in his own time and was awarded by Parliament an enormous sum of money in 1815 of Cambridge and a lectureship in divinity at Oxford. A few years earlier the first Regius Professorship was endowed in Aberdeen, and Henry VIII established the first ones in England among others in Law, Greek and Medicine. The Lucasian chair in mathematics at Cambridge was the first privately-endowed chair, per Henry Lucas's will, in 1663. Isaac Newton was the second holder of the chair and held it for 33 years and it is still considered to be one of the most prestigious academic chairs in the world.
The problem with identifying the exact effect of the existence of endowed chairs, membership in honor societies, honorary doctorates, book prizes and other academic awards on ex ante work is of course that the vast bulk is on the work of people who do not win any awards and are thus is a way disappointed. Indeed, the welfare costs of such disappointments should be subtracted from the consumer surplus generated by advances in useful knowledge. At the same time, of course, there is the sense of having contributed to human progress, which is still an extrinsic if elusive motive. It is interesting to note that in the eighteenth century the areas affected by the Industrial Revolution faced a number of well-defined and well-focused problems that were widely understood to require a solution. Each of these problems was solved by a single or very few individuals, each of whom earned considerable fame in his age. Of those, the examples of Edward Jenner and the Montgolfière brothers stand out, who defeated long-standing challenges that had occupied the best minds of the age. But there were quite a few others: John Harrison who single-12 handedly solved the problem of measuring longitude at sea; Henry Cort who cracked the A petition for the estate of Henry Cort for a financial reward on account of the importance of the invention 13 was denied by Parliament, but the fact that other ironmasters entered a subscription for the benefit of Cort's widow demonstrates that contemporaries were aware of the significance of his invention of the puddling and rolling process. technological bottleneck of converting pig iron into wrought iron; James Hargreaves, the first to build a machine that definitely replaced human fingers in the spinning process with metal draw bars and mechanical spindles; Thomas Newcomen and John Smeaton who helped reduce mine-flooding.
Of those, only Hargreaves and Newcomen died in relative obscurity but their glory was captured by others.
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Reputation games, then, are the key to understand what motivates scientists, inventors, and other intellectual innovators. This is of course not to deny that intrinsic motivations do matter, but the two tend to be hard to separate. Consider the case of Humphry Davy, one of most notable scientists of the early nineteenth century and, among many other achievements, the co-inventor of the "Miner's Friend," a safety lamp that reduced the risk of coal mine explosions. Davy quite explicitly stated that his motivation was to help prevent mine disasters and save lives, and expressly refused to patent the invention. Yet this did not stop him from engaging in a rather ugly priority dispute with George Stephenson who invented a similar device quite independently, arguing that an untrained (if ingenious) artisan could not have come up with the idea of the lamp. Be that as it may, it is telling that even here seemingly intrinsic motivation was flavored by an ambition to receive reputational credit for an invention that was supposed to benefit mankind. Equally revealing is the case of the Dutch microscopist Anthonie van Leeuwenhoek, a self-taught and able mathematician, who was hired by his city of residence, Delft in the Netherlands, in various positions such as surveyor and inspector of weights and measures. Yet his true interest was the manufacturing and use of microscopes, and he communicated his findings (written originally in Dutch) to the Royal Society in London, which published many of his letters. In 1680 he was elected a Fellow, and clearly this was a source of pride for him, as he had it engraved on his tombstone and a painting of him by Jan Verkolje shows him proudly displaying his Royal Society diploma of membership.
Not every intellectual innovator played the reputation game as hard as they could. Some of them were eccentric recluses who only published their work rarely and were content to do their work alone, most of all Henry Cavendish, an English chemist in the eighteenth century, the discoverer of hydrogen, and in some views "without peer in eighteenth century English natural philosophy... the first after Newton to possess mathematical and experimental talents at all comparable to Newton's" (McCormmach, 2008, p. 159) . While he published a number of things, many of his important findings remained unpublished and discovered only many years after his death. Newton himself had to be persuaded by Edmund Halley to publish the third volume of Principia and in many ways does not fit the picture of anyone driven by extrinsic motivation. During his so-called "years of silence" at Trinity College prior to the publication of Principia in 1687, Newton worked on a large number of projects that seem understandable only through pure intrinsic motivation. Among them were unpublished essays on theology, a detailed plan of the Jerusalem temple based on the scriptures, and an enormous number of writing on chemical problems which were barely known in his lifetime.
